HISTORICAL MINIATURES JOURNAL ISSUE NUMBER 12

BY GEORGE GRASSE

KIT DESCRIPTION

The 1:48 scale WW1 airplane covered in this issue is the Copper State 1:48 scale resin cast kit of the German AEG C.IV that is to be modified into the AEG N.I (C.IVn) configuration.  As a reminder, the designation AEG N.I (C.IVn) refers to the late-war designation "N" for single-engine, two-seat night bombing aircraft and "C.IVn" refers to the those aircraft of the first production aircraft built before the "N-type" designation was created.  The small case "n" was the early designator for single-engine night bomber.

I have described the basic kit contents for the Copper State AEG C.IV in previous HM Journal articles and you can refer to them here: HM Journal Issue 6.  I should point out that many limited run resin kits are not necessarily complete kits.  In this kit, for example, the modeler has to scratch-build a number of parts including the landing gear axle sub-assembly and struts, gunner's seat, rudder bar, control stick, wing struts, cabane flat struts, cabane "V" struts, and various braces internal to the AEG C.IV observer cockpit (but not needed on the AEG N.I).  Also, most resin kits are best handled by experienced modelers.  They are quite demanding.

Not supplied in the kit or otherwise replaced are a number of items which I will detail in the step-by-step Construction section below.  I used the following after-market accessories:

MODEL TO BE BUILT

This is another model I knew I would have research authenticity problems for three reasons: 1) photographic evidence history of this aircraft is sparse largely because so few were built; 2) photographs and/or historical documentation of a specific crew, serial number, unit, date, and surrounding circumstances is also sparse; 3) the details of exactly how these aircraft were used is not available to me in the form of documented German manual or set of instructions.  I will have to infer quite a bit from the references I have.  At this point, I am going with my interpretation of the photo at the top of this page which I believe is C.9378/16 and, therefore, the 56th AEG C.IVn of the first production batch.

This model requires substantial number of modifications including a converted engine, addition of the observer's gun ring, addition of underwing bomb racks, and, most difficult of all, the modification from a two-bay biplane to a three-bay biplane.  All of the details that make the AEG N.I different from any other aircraft with the exception of the late-war Sablatnig N.I (of which few reached the Front) will be detailed further on.  The single most outstanding difference between the AEG N.I and its progenitor the AEG C.IV is the wingspan necessary to carry a heavy bomb load.  Illustration 1 compares the two aircraft in half plan views.

Illustration 1: COMPARING THE AEG N.I (C.IVn) TO THE AEG C.IV

AEG N.I (C.IVn) HALF PLAN	AEG C.IV HALF PLAN
The AEG C.IV required two sets (or bays) of wing struts on each side where the AEG N.I required three giving larger wing area.  Note the great similarity of the two aircraft.  Some of the major differences between the two aircraft are the observer/gunner's cockpit shape, the right-hand exhaust of the 160 hp Mercedes D.III engine on the AEG C.IV (left) and the left-hand exhaust of the 150 hp Benz Bz.III engine of the AEG N.I (right), the presence of landing lights on the small cut out at the leading edge of the AEG N.I upper wing, and slight differences to the arrangement and size of the upper wing center section.  Not shown in these images is another substantial difference and that is the camouflage scheme which will be detailed further on.
These frontal views show the difference between the two aircraft.  Note how the AEG N.I (left) strut configuration is slanted.   You can see the projection of the exhaust stack: the Benz Bz.III (left) and Mercedes D.III (right).  One important characteristic is the underwing bomb brackets for the AEG N.I, each capable of holding one 50 kg bomb for a total load of 300 kg.  The AEG C.IV had a modest internal load of four 12.5 kg bombs, or 50 kg total.  I marked the location of the landing lights on the AEG N.I.  Night landing accidents were are more significant cause of night bombing casualties than from enemy action, fighters or anti-aircraft.
Image credits go to Martin Digmayer whose excellent general arrangement drawings have appeared in hundreds of publications.  The image of the AEG C.IV was cropped from the general arrangement drawing appearing in the Copper State instruction and information packet for the kit, CS1017, of the AEG C.IV.  The image of the AEG N.I was cropped from the Rare Birds article  "AEG N.I (C.IVn)", written by Peter M. Grosz and Jack Herris for Over the Front Volume 23 Issue 4 produced by the League of World War I Aviation Historians.

Illustration 2: THE OTHER SINGLE-ENGINE NIGHT BOMBER - SABLATNIG N.I

AN ABRIDGED (AND SHORT) HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I STRATEGIC BOMBING

One basic definition as given in the Dictionary of the First World War is, "the potential of aircraft to launch long-range attacks deep inside hostile territory and to disrupt an enemy's vital socioeconomic process." ³ The only aerial weapon at the beginning of the war that met these criteria was the dirigible (airship) and Germany was the only nation that used and added to this force from the beginning.  On the night of 19/20 January 1915, the first German airship raid against Britain was launched.  However, by May 1917, the twin-engine Gotha bombers began the their strategic bombing campaign against Britain and the airship was phased out as a weapon due largely to the vagaries of the weather and their catastrophic vulnerability when hit by enemy fire from improved night fighters and AAA.  To be sure, airships were used by all of the large nations and they made appearances in nearly all theaters in rather limited scale.  The airship attacks against Britain more or less proved the strategic bombing theory especially if you focus on "socioeconomic" part of the definition.  All belligerents were convinced of the fear factor and/or the retaliation factor; so, as much as it was strategic bombing it was also purposeful indiscriminate bombing hiding under the guise of directing attacks only against military targets.  Now to the aeroplanes. ⁴

By November 1914 when the Great War was barely four months old, aeroplane strategic bombing was created, first by France on 23 November ⁵ followed in days by Germany on 27 November⁴.  Both initiatives involved official orders creating bomber units.  In France, this was the 1^er Groupe de Bombardment under the Chief of Staff of the GQG or Grand Quartier Général (General Headquarters) ⁵ and, in Germany, Brieftauben-Abteilung Ostende or BAO, also under the equivalent general headquarters, Oberst-Heeresleitung or OHL.  The German unit, translated, means "carrier pigeon section, Ostend" (Belgium), the codename for strategic bombing.  A second unit, Brieftauben-Abteilung Metz or BAM, was created and both were operational on the Western and Eastern Fronts by late Spring 1915 but operated more as a strategic aviation reserve than a strategic bombing force. ⁶

Whereas the French actually deployed bombers, such as they were, and conducted daylight bombing raids across the Rhine, into the Saar valley, and into Lorraine,  all military or industrial targets, the Germans equipped their BAO and BAM units with two-seater reconnaissance aircraft that conducted few strategic raids.  Rather, the force was used to supplement air strength in sectors where combat was heavy, either offensively or defensively.  By early 1916, the French had abandoned daylight raids because of high losses due to the newly developed single-engine fighter and resorted exclusively to night bombing.  The Germans recognized the importance of the strategic reserve and in December 1915 officially changed the unit designation to Kampfgeschwader der OHL or "battle squadron" (abbreviated Kagohl or KG) each composed of six Kampfstaffeln (flights, or Kastas) of six two-seater aircraft each. ⁷  

Curiously, the German aviation industry had developed large twin-engined bombing aircraft that were initially deployed to Kastas in ones and twos to be used as aerial battle airplanes to assist in "combat" against enemy aircraft.  At the beginning of the Verdun offensive in February 1916, the Germans developed the aerial strategy of "barrage patrol" or sperrflug, intended to block enemy aircraft from penetrating the German front line and discovering troop movements, artillery emplacements, and dumps.  Two Kagohls were deployed at the outset of the offensive and attempted to perform their blockading mission but given varying heights at which enemy aircraft could fly and the great distances along the front, it was impossible to prevent French aircraft from performing interdiction, reconnaissance, and fighter patrols.  Kasta two-seaters and the large, twin-engined "battle planes" were outclassed by the nimble French Nieuport fighters (Types 11 and 14) and it took the re-deployment of Fokker Eindeckers to Verdun to help defend the air space.  Germany was still having great difficulty in the air all along the Western Front.  The Allies had equal or better aircraft and they had twice as many available for deployment. 

Although the concept of Germany's strategic reserve of their Kagohl units had merit, their intended use as "combat" aircraft was proven false simply by aerial combat casualties and the increased success of more Fokker Eindecker fighters and, by Spring 1916, the deployment of more nimble German biplane fighters such as the Halberstadt D.II.  Fighters were the true "combat" aircraft and Germany finally recognized this.  An emphasis was placed on the production of twin-engined bombers principally built by AEG, Friedrichshafen, and Gotha.  Daylight bombing was the natural method for strategic bombing because it offered relatively easy navigation and target acquisition.  However, as more of the twin-engined bombers deployed and more daylight bombing attacks were completed, casualties mounted because more Allied fighters and much improved AAA took advantage of the bombers' slow speed, lack of maneuverability, and no escorts.  On 7 July  1917, the last daylight raid over England by Kagohl 3 from bases in Belgium was conducted.  On the night of 4/5 September 1917, the first night raid on London was conducted.  The raids on London, day and night, were conducted by twin-engined Gotha bombers.  During the period of their use in the daylight bombing role from May to July 1917, London area defenses were built up to such an extent that, simply put, the Gothas were taking unacceptable losses. ⁸

AN ABRIDGED (AND SHORT) HISTORY OF STRATEGIC NIGHT BOMBING

Night bombing changed the tactics used to reach, attack, and return from a target.  Bombers could no longer fly in formation for fear of hitting other aircraft in the formation.  Instead, bombers took off singly at timed intervals.  They reached their target and bombed as individual attacker.  They returned to base in much the same manner and, with the aid of a complicated system of flares and flashing signals, were able to acquire their landing fields who, upon the correct sequence of signs, turned on the field's landing lights at which time the bomber turned its landing lights on.  However, landing accidents were still a major problem and accounted for most of the losses.

Night bombing was safer than daylight bombing and many improvements had already been implemented.  Navigation was aided by the placement of search light beams at known locations that guided the aircraft on the correct flight path.  Engines were turned off as the aircraft glided on its bombing run thus making it difficult for ground defenses to pick up the bomber with sensitive sounding equipment.  Cockpit lights, exhaust dampeners, and dark camouflage made the bombers difficult to see even on moonlit nights.  By early 1918, a number of C-Type (single-engine, two-seater) aircraft were attached to each Kagohl and they preceded the flight, some being used to verify the weather (leaving quite early) and others used to mark the target with flares (leaving just before).

Aside from landing accidents, the scourge of the night flying bomber was searchlight-assisted AAA and increasingly sophisticated night fighting tactics.  When illuminated by a searchlight beam, the pilot would often put the nose down and bank slightly left or right.  Once out of the beam, the aircraft was difficult to re-acquire.  The Allies countered by reinforcing their searchlight schemes and trained operators to follow their target.  AAA was improved especially with light, exploding and incendiary ammunition.  A full-strength Kagohl of three Staffels could bomb with 18 aircraft but if one were lost to night fighters, and one to AAA, and one to landing accident, that's about a 17% loss for one mission.  Germany could build enough aircraft - the problem was replacing the experienced crews.

AN ABRIDGED (AND SHORT) HISTORY OF TACTICAL NIGHT BOMBING

I finally arrive at the mission of the AEG N.I: tactical night bombing.  As might be recalled from my earlier articles, I discussed the purpose and aircraft inventory of the Flieger-Abteilung (FA) and Flieger-Abteilung (Artillerie) (FA(A) units.  None of these maintained their allotted aircraft inventory of six or nine aircraft of a single type or from a single manufacturer.  There were two reasons for this: 1) although Germany could produce aircraft, what was available at any given time was sent directly to an Armee-Flugpark (AFP or army aviation park) who distributed the aircraft to their assigned FA and FA(A) units on a "need to replace" basis; 2) in every FA or FA(A) unit there were specialized missions that were best carried out by one manufacturers type than another.  In 1917, when strategic night bombing became a relatively necessary and safe strategy, local commanders at the division and corps level came up with the idea of having a night bombing capability for tactical short-range targets on their immediate front that could not be destroyed with artillery fire.

The contemporary C-Type of the day could carry 50 kg of bombs; stripped down, perhaps more.  It probably happened that stripping down an aircraft that was otherwise intended for reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and photography, took away that one aircraft from those missions.  What was needed was a single-engine C-Type that could carry close to a G-Type (twin-engine bomber) load.  Sometime in early 1917, Idflieg issued a specification that called for such an aircraft that could carry a minimum bomb load of 300 kg.  The AEG company responded with a modification to their AEG C.IV biplane which became known initially as the C.IVn.  Eventually, this would evolve into the new designation of AEG N.I.  As these aircraft were produced, they were assigned to certain aviation units operating directly in support of the front line.  More than likely, these units had specially enhanced authorized inventory of nine aircraft as opposed to the normal six aircraft.

Missions were conducted in much the same manner as described for the strategic bombers but on a smaller scale with usually just one aircraft.  The first appearance of the AEG N.I on the frontline inventory (Frontbestand) were 2 aircraft in at the end of October 1917.  For the moment, here is a review of frontline inventory for the N-Type as shown in Table 1.  Note that the data reflects available aircraft at the units and their aviation parks (AFP).  Also note that the data ends with the August 1918 entry; after this time, German records are incomplete.

Table 1: Front Line Inventory of N-Types ⁹

Several interpretations of the data are possible.  It seems obvious that the AEG N.I design, based on the 1915-16 AEG C.IV, was phasing out and the newer Sablatnig N.I was phasing in.  I cannot explain the falling off of N-Types beginning in April 1918 unless Sablatnig N.I production was delayed.  As you might recall, Sablatnig was primarily a naval floatplane manufacturer and could have had problems getting their landplane night bomber off the production line.  Other questions linger: 1) was the N-Type classification phasing out anyway?  2) What caused the approximate 50% reduction in available AEG N.I aircraft from February to April 1918?  and, 3) What caused the 63% drop from April to June 1918?   

AEG N.I (C.IVn) DESCRIBED

The AEG N.I (C.IVn) had a welded steel tube, box-girder fuselage frame covered in fabric.  The extra-long wingspan was of wood construction with two full-span spars and wings ribs interspersed with leading edge riblets to reinforce the leading edge fabric from the forces of drag.  It too was covered in fabric.  During initial weight tests, the wing failed and a trestle structure was fitted to the wing center section, fore and aft, as reinforcement; this solved the problem and, with the three-bay configuration with outward tilting wing struts, became a key recognition feature of the aircraft.  The tail unit was the unaltered C.IV version of a welded steel tube framework covered in fabric.

Minor alterations at the nose allowed for the fitting of the Benz Bz.III 150 hp in-line, six-cylinder engine.  The engine exhaust stack was heightened and possibly fitted with a muffler/flame dampener so as not to reveal the aircraft's exhaust and minimize its sound at night.  With a full 300 kg bomb load, fuel, and two-crew, the aircraft was slow and had a low operating ceiling but at night over relatively short distances, this hardly mattered.

The forward firing Spandau machine gun was deleted as was some other equipment.  Structurally, from a side view, the AEG N.I resembled the C.IV except for the engine and the raised observer/gunner's cockpit which now had a true gun ring (or turret) for the flexible Parabellum machine gun, the only defensive armament.  Three external bomb racks were fitted on the underside of the lower wing and an external mechanical bomb release mechanism was fitted.  It ran from the underwing bomb racks to the outside bottom of the rear cockpit on each side and terminated with a handle that the observer/gunner could grasp and pull upwards to release the bomb load.  

There does not seem to have been an effort to improve the landing gear for night operations when a sudden, unexpected drop in just a few feet could cause a hard landing.  Landing lights were fitted to the upper wing in line with the center set of wing struts.  These plus the aerodrome's lights assisted greatly in night landings but were susceptible to recognition by roving enemy night aircraft and could attract unwanted visitors.  Additional information is provided in Tables 2 and 3, below.

Table 2: AEG N.I( C.IVn) Specifications ¹⁰

Table 3: AEG N.I( C.IVn) Production Serial Numbers ¹⁰

According to Grosz in his Rare Birds article page 361, the actual delivery schedule of the aircraft to the Western Front is not known because Frontbestand in Table 1, above, does not start to show availability until October 1917 when two machines are recorded.  All dates on the Frontbestand table are month-ending date (i.e., as of 31 October, for instance); and, there is a two month gap between reporting periods.  It is probable to assume that a number of these aircraft were at the Front in the August to September 1917 time frame but how many remains a guess.  Certainly, a few had to have been issued during this time for combat field trials.

MODEL CONSTRUCTION

As with all aircraft I build, I maintain a "construction" page for each one in my "World War I Aircraft in 1:48 Scale" section.  Click on the link in the box below or go on to the "Camouflage Finish & Markings" section below.

AEG N.I (C.IVn) CAMOUFLAGE FINISH & MARKINGS

The basic camouflage finish for this aircraft is a factory-applied, hand-painted four-color hexagonal night scheme over the entire surface of the aircraft.  I based the scheme on a Bob Pearson color profile from Over the Front ¹¹

Illustration 3: AEG N.I Color Artwork by Robert N. Pearson, Over the Front, Vol. 23, Issue 4

The four-color palette consists of light green, mid-blue, magenta, and black as shown in Table 4 below which shows a color swatch and the test wing I painted.  The paint used was Vallejo acrylics and the formulas I created are found on the AEG N.I (C.IVn) Construction Page.  All Eisernes Kreuz insignia are matt black without the usual white outline.  The only other marking is the serial number in matt black on the fin.  Smaller instructional markings such as "lift here" and the weight table are in matt black.

The secret to painting the hexagons was quite simple.  I created an image of hexagons from an old wargaming sheet.  I sized it down to fit the scale and printed it on Micro-Mark clear/blue backing decal paper on my HP laser jet.  Before applying the decal, I decided that one of the colors would be painted over all surfaces which would eliminate having to hand-paint one of the four colors.  I chose the light green.  Also, before applying the clear hexagon decal, I decided early on not to glue any parts to the aircraft: wings, horizontal tail, vertical fin and rudder, wheels, and ailerons.  These were individually hand-painted in light green over which the decal was applied.  I painstakingly painted each of the hexes in a pattern to match Bob Pearson's profile.

Table 4: Paint Color Swatches for the Hexagonal Camouflage used on the AEG N.I (C.IVn)

	Vallejo Mix of VC0913 First Hexagonal Night Camouflage Color
	Vallejo VC0872 Second Hexagonal Night Camouflage Color
	Vallejo VC0856 Third Hexagonal Night Camouflage Color
	Vallejo Flat Black VC0997 Fourth Hexagonal Night Camouflage Color

 

AEG N.I (C.IVn) C.9378/16 FINISHED PHOTO GALLERY

 

-------------------------------------  FINIS  --------------------------------------

FOOTNOTES

¹ Gray & Thetford, German Aircraft of the First World War, page 549, photo provided by Alex Imrie.  This source was published in 1962 and says simply, "No more than a single prototype is thought to have been built".  However, Peter M. Grosz produced his Frontbestand in 1985 and 1986 in which "Class N" showed that there were 2 at the Front in June 1918 and 9 in August 1918 (no reliable records beyond those dates).  Clearly, the Sablatnig was the intended replacement for AEG N.I whose numbers were declining, 7 in June 1918 and only 4 in August 1918.  It is also possible to assume the "Class N" machines were phasing out entirely!

² Leaman, Paul (compiler), Atlas of German and Foreign Seaplanes: Sablatnig Floatplanes, Cross & Cockade International, Summer 2010 Volume 41/2.  The original German title Atlas deutscher und ausländischer Seeflugzeuge is presently being reproduced with new comments and photos by CCI in installments.

³  Pope, Stephen, and Elizabeth-Anne Wheal, Dictionary of the First World War, page 452.  As will be seen further on in my discussion, strategic bombing took many twists and turns but was largely limited by the technology of the day.  Bombers could never range far enough or carry enough of a load to be more than a sizeable nuisance although others would argue otherwise.

⁴ Castle, Ian.  London 1914-17: The Zeppelin Menace, Osprey Campaign Series No. 193.  This source does an excellent job of historically reporting the specific events of the German airship raids.  Note: all airships bombing London were "Zeppelins" named after a German manufacturer who built the majority of these giants.  The major manufacturer in Germany was the Schütte-Lanz company but to the British people who endured these raids, they were all "Zeppelins".

⁵ Martel, René.  French Strategic and Tactical Bombardment Forces of World War I, page 22.   The creation date is really an official GQG directive authorizing the creation of the 1^er Groupe de Bombardment (GB 1) which was formed up by December 1914.  There followed the creation of three more; GB 2 in December 1914, GB 3 in March 1915, and GB 4 in March 1914.  Each Groupes de Bombardment consisted of three Escadrilles each of six aircraft. 

⁶ Sumner, Ian.  German Air Forces 1914-18, Osprey Elite Series No. 135, pages 25-26.

⁷ Cuneo, John R. The Air Weapon 1914-1916, page178-180.  The author lays down the reason for not following the doctrine of strategic bombing was a "diversion" explained as: "The armies badly needed armed airplanes and the distinction between an armed two-seater (with which the bombing squadrons were still equipped) and the single-seater was not clear to the army headquarters: both were "combat" planes".  In other words, local army commanders all along the Western Front were clamoring for aircraft to engage or "combat" enemy aerial penetration over and beyond their front lines.  This activity, they said, frightened the troops and lowered moral because there were too few or no German aircraft to contest them.  It is true that the strategic bombing purpose was "diverted" but, too me, the main reasons were the acknowledgement that the two-seaters had insignificant bomb load capacity and could not fly far enough to hit vital strategic targets.  Since all of the two-seaters were C-Type aircraft armed with a forward-firing Spandau and a flexible rear-firing Parabellum, they were the only available reserve to counter enemy air activity over the front.

⁸ Castle, Ian.  London 1917-18: The Bomber Blitz, Osprey Campaign Series No. 227, pages 18-36.  Another competent overall analysis of the Gotha bombing raids.  The left-over defenses from the Zeppelin attacks were allowed to lapse.  In the time between the cessation of the Zeppelin attacks and the first Gotha attacks, some RFC squadrons and AAA guns were re-deployed to the Western Front.  The Gotha Raids were a great surprise to the British people.  However,  London defenses and other likely Gotha target areas were brought up to strength and improved and finally, in May 1918, the raids ceased altogether especially because night fighter tactics and AAA were greatly improved.  Thereafter, the Gothas of Kagohl 3 were used to hit strategic targets at night on the Western Front.

⁹ Grosz, Peter M. Archiv: Frontbestand.  The Journal of the Early Aeroplane "WWI Aero", issue108 (Feb 1986), page 69. 

¹⁰ Grosz, Peter M. AEG N.I (C.IVn) Rare Birds, Over the Front, Volume 23, Issue 4, page 362. 

¹¹ Pearson, Robert.  AEG N.I, Over the Front, Vol. 23, Issue 4, inside back cover. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RECOMMENDED READING LIST:

Castle, Ian.  London 1914-17: The Zeppelin Menace, Osprey Campaign Series No. 193. Botley, Oxford (UK): Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2008.

Castle, Ian.  London 1917-18: The Bomber Blitz, Osprey Campaign Series No. 227.  Botley, Oxford (UK): Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2010.

Cuneo, John R. The Air Weapon 1914-1916, Volume II of Winged Mars.  Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1947.

Gray, Peter and Owen Thetford.  German Aircraft of the First World War.  London: Putnam & Company, 1962.

Grosz, Peter M. Archiv: Frontbestand.  The Journal of the Early Aeroplane "WWI Aero", issues 107 (Dec 1985) and 108 (Feb 1986).

Grosz, Peter. M. AEG N.I (C.IVn) Rare Birds, Over the Front, Volume 23, Issue 4.  League of World War I Aviation Historians, 2008.

Martel, René.  French Strategic and Tactical Bombardment Forces of World War I.  Translated by Allen Suddaby, edited by Steven Suddaby.  Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press Inc, 2007. 

Pearson, Robert N.  AEG N.I color profile, Over the Front, Volume 23, Issue 4, Winter 2008.

Pope, Stephen and Elizabeth-Anne Wheal.  Dictionary of the First World War.  Barnsley, Yorkshire (UK): Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2003.

Sumner, Ian.  German Air Forces 1914-18, Osprey Elite Series No. 135.  Botley, Oxford (UK): Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2005.

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